WARD v. KRUPATRICK.
would be of no importance, since the
party might as well rely upon the second
injury, as the former one thereby revived,
if they were precisely equivalent." So
in Robbins v. Robbins, 100 Mass. 150
(1868), condonation of cruelty was extinguished by the mere fact that for a
period of six weeks, the husband, though
living in the same house with his wife,
wholly and continuously refused to speak
to ber; such evidence of persistent and
enduring unkindness and ill-temper, not
only being itself a breach of marital
duties, but also warranting the wife or
the court in inferring that the husband's

RECENT

smothered anger might again break out
into acts of positive cruelty. And see
Gardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray 434. And
in Phidllips v. Phillips, 27 Wis. 252
(1870), it was held that the subsequent
misconduct might be of a slighter nature
than would have been necessary to constitute an original ground of divorce.
See also Davis v. Davis, 19 IIl. 334
(1857), that condoned adultery may be
revived by subsequent cruelty. Apparently, therefore, there is an entire
uniformity of decisions in both countries
on this subject.
EnDuiw IE. BMMIET.

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of New York.
WARD v. KILPATRICK.
Three requisites constitute the criterion of a fixture : 1, actual annexation to
the realty, or something appurtenant thereto ; 2, application to the use or purpose
to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated ; 3, the
intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the
freehold.
Where the owner of a house in process of construction contracted with the plaintiff for mirror frames to be set in the hall and parlor, those in the hall filling up and
occupying a gap left in the wainscoting, and those in the parlor fitted into a gap
purposely left in the baseboard, and both being fastened to the walls with hooks and
screws, and intended by the owner to be permanently attached to the buildings, and
to go with them, when sold, as essential parts of the building: Held, that they
became part and parcel of the building itself, and, therefore, that the work done by
the plaintiff was work upon the house, that the materials furnished were in its construction, and therefore that a lien attached to the building under the mechanic's
lien law.

to foreclose a mechanic's lien under the Act of 1875,
applicable to the city of New York. The defendant was owner
of eight houses in process of construction, and bad contracted
with plaintiff for.mirror frames to be set in the parlor and hall of
each house, those in the halls to be arranged to serve the purpose
of hat-racks and umbrella-stands. The work having been completed as plaintiff claimed, he presented his bill, and, payment
being refused, filed the mechanic's lien which is now sought to be
foreclosed.
ACTION
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Joseph Fettrech, for appellant.
John .L. Miller, for appellee.
FINCH, J.-lad the articles furnished become so attached to
the buildings in progress of construction as to justify a lien under
the Act of 1875? The language of its first section is, "every
person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used
in the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, &c.,
8hall have lien upon the same." Labor upon the building and
materials used in its construction are the tests of the lienor's
rights. In other words, the work and the materials, both in fact
and in intention, must have become part and parcel of the building itself. The inquiry approaches so nearly the doctrine of
fixtures as to make the decisions in that respect authoritative, and
the necessary guides to our conclusion. If, as between vendor
and vendee, the mirror frames in question would have passed by a
deed of the real estate, without special enumeration or description,
it will follow that they formed part of the house, and were elements in its construction, and so furnished a basis for the lien
claimed. The general subject was much discussed in this court in
MoRea v. Bank, 66 N. Y. 489. The results arrived at were as
precise and definite as the nature of the subject would permit, and
must form the basis of our judgment. The question arose between
mortgago t and mortgagee, and three requisites were named as the
criterion of a fixture. These were, first, actual annexation to the
realty or something appurtenant thereto; second, application to
the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is
connected is appropriated; and, third, the intention of the party
making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the
freehold. The mirror frames in the present case were actually
annexed to the realty, they were so annexed during the process of
building, and as part of that process, they were not brought as
furniture into the completed house, but themselves formed part of
such completion; those in the hall filled up and occupied a gap
left in the wainscoting; they were an essential part of the inner
surface of the hall, and of a material and construction to correspond with and properly form part of such inner surface, and
those in the parlor fitted into a gap purposely left in the baseboard.
Both those in the hall and those in the parlor were fastened to the
walls with hooks and screws, and they could be removed, but their
removal would leave unfinished walls, and require work upon the
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house to supply and repair their absence. They were fitted to
the use and purpose for which the part of the building they occupied was designed; they formed part of the inner wall, and their
construction and finish was made to correspond with the cabinet
work of the rooms. In each house they faced each other and
formed the most prominent feature of the internal ornamentation.
They were intended by the owner to be permanently attached to
the buildings, and to go with them when sold as essential parts of
the construction. Three of the houses were in fact thus sold.
The owner testified as to these frames that he regarded them as
"the most attractive portion of the house ;" that he stated to the
agent of the maker that it was very important to have a few of
the frames in immediately, "so that a party who would be desirous
of purchasing the house could see these mirrors and hat-racks ;"
that the agreement with Mr. Evers was that he should go on
immediately and put in the frames in two or three of the houses,
"so as to be able to show what the houses would be, without
delay ;" that the kind of work he called this particular work that
was to be done, was "cabinet carpentering ;" that on one or more
occasions he complained of the work not having been done, adding,
"and that I could not get my houses ready for market ;" and
that he was very strenuous about having the frames put up,
"because he wished to show the houses to some parties." These
facts indicate very plainly the purpose and intention of the owner
to permanently attach the frames to the building and make them
a part of the structure. It follows that they became parcel of the
realty, and as between vendor and vendee would have passed by
deed. The recent case of MicKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co.,
81 N. Y. 38, does not conflict with this conclusion. In that case
the proof showed that the mirrors "were not set into the walls ;"
were put up after the house had been built; were capable of being
easily detached without interfering with or injuring the walls; and
were as much mere furniture as pictures hung in the usual way.
The difference between the cases is obvious. We are of opinion,
therefore, that the work done by the lienor was work upon the
house, and that the materials furnished were used in its construction. The objection that no lien attached cannot be sustained.
Judgment affirmed.
The true criterion of an irremovable
fixture is believed to consist in the united
application of these three tests :-

1st. Real or constructive annexation
of the article in question to the realty.
2d. Appropriation or adaptation to
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the use or purpose- of that part of the
tealty with which it is connected.
3d. The intention of the party making
the annexation to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold, this
intention being inferred from the nature
of the article affixed, the relation and
situation of the party making the annexation and the policy of the law in relation thereto, the structure and mode
of the annexation, and the purpose or
use for which the annexation has been
made: Ewell on Fixtures 21.
The
rule is laid down in the leading case of
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 530, substantially as above stated, except that
actual annexation alone is made a requisite in the first subdivision of the rule,
as it is also in the principal case. The
rule, as stated in Teaff v. Hewitt, is apapproved in Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan
316; FTnlc v. Brigaldi, 4 Daly 361;
Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 296;
Quinby v. Manhattan Cloth Co., 24 N.
J. Eq. 260; Potts v. N. J. Arms Co.,
17 Id. 404; Rogers v. Brokaw, 25 Id.
498 ; Edwards v. Derrickson, 28 N. J.
Law 56; Redlon v. Barker, 4 Kan.
451; Rogers v. Crow, 40 Mo. 96;
Greenv. Phillips, 26 Gratt. 759. There
can be no doubt, however, as it seems
to the writer, that in many cases actual
annexation is unnecessary, and that constructive annexation is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the rule.
See the subject considered generally in
Ewell on Fixtures 8, et seq., where the
cases will be found collected. See, especially, the cases of Snedeker v. Waring,
12 N. Y. 170; and D'Eyncourt v.
Gregory, L. R., 3 Eq. 382. "1Of the
three tests, above stated, the clear tendency of modem authority seems to be
to give pre-eminence to the question of
intention to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold, and the
otners seem to derive their chief value
as evidence of such intention :" Ewell
on Fixtures 22, where a large number
of cases will be found cited in the notes.

ILPATRICK.
.3fackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717, was
a case very similar in its facts to the
principal case. In that case, the mirrors were set in the wall by making
recesses therein, which recesses would
be left in their rough state if the mirrors
were removed. The mirrors were secured in their places by architraves or
large wooden frames nailed to plugs of
bard wood fastened in the wall, the
frames of the mirrors having grooves in
them corresponding to tongues in the
architraves, and nails driven from one to
the other to make the glass more secure.
Under art. 459, Rev. C. C., providing
that IIthings which the owner of a tract
of land has placed upon it for its service and improvement, are immovable
by destination," giving examples, and
"that all such movables as the owner
has attached permanently to the tenement or to the building are likewise immovable by destination," these mirrors
were held to be permanently attached.
So, in Cave v. Cave, 2 Ver. 508;
s. c., 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 275, it was held
that although pictures and glasses, generally speaking, are part of the personal
estate, yet if put up instead of wainscot, or where otherwise wainscot would
have been, they shall go to the heir, to
whom the house ought not to come
maimed and disfigured. See, however,
Beck v. Rebow, 1 P. Wins. 94. See
further, where mirrors have been in controversy, though not always as between
mortgagor and mortgagee, vendor and
vendee and executor and heir (in all
which relations the same rule as to removal prevails): Birch v. Dawson, 6
C. & P. 658; s. c. 2 Ad. & E. 37;
Guthriev.Jones, 108 Mfass. 191 ; !'Eyncourt v. Gregory, Law Rep., 3 Eq. 382 ;
s. c. 36 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 107 ; s. c. 15
W. R. 186.
In the well considered and interesting
case of D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, above
cited, where the question arose between
one claiming under a tenant for life, and
the remainderman, the portrait in oil on
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canvas and stretcher was fastened by
nails or screws to blocks or plugs of
wood iaserted in the brick-work of the
wall, with a wooden moulding around
and in front of the picture, and attached
by screws or nails to plugs in the wall.
The tapestries in question were each also
on wooden stretchers attached to the
wall, and had mouldings around them in
the same manner as the oil portrait.
The carved and gilt frames filled with
satin occupied the sides of the rooms, and
were attached with nails or screws only,
but were used instead of paper as a cover
for the walls. The chimney-glass in an
ornamental frame, with an oil painting
burmounting it, was placed against the
flush face of the wall and attached with
nails or screws only, as an ordinary
looking-glass would be fixed, and could
easily be taken down.

Lord ROmILLy,

if. R., held that the chimney-glass and
the ornamental frame and the painting
surmounting it, were no part of the house
or the wall, but merely ornaments, and
hence removable, but that the other
articles above described were a part of
the house and could not be removed.
In JfcKeage v. Hanover FireIns. Co.,
16 Hun 239, mantel-mirrors hung on
hooks driven into the wall, and piermirrors resting on a casing at the bottom
and attached to a hold-fast at the" top,
which was driven into the wall, the cornice being of the design of the mirrorframe and connected with it, were held
to be personal property and not covered
by a mortgage of the house.
In Roaers v. Crow, 40 Mlo. 91, where,
in the erecnon of a church, a recess was

left to receive the organ which was required to complete the architectural
design and finish the building, and which
was fastened to the platform built to receive it, by nails driven through the
outer case into the floor, the wall in the
rear of the organ being in a rough and
unfinished state and pretty much without
ceiling or finish, it was held that the
organ was to be considered as annexed
to the freehold, and that it passed by a
sale of the realty.
A cupboard, however, fitted into a
recess and fastened there by nails or
screws, has been held to be merely furniture and not to pass with the realty:
Blethen v. Towle, 40 Ale. 310. So,
marble-slabs placed by the owner in a
house belonging to him after its completion, and resting upon, but not fastened
to, brackets screwed into the walls, are
a part of the furniture of the house,
and do not pass with the house to the
vendee : Weston v. Weston, 102 Mass.
514.
It may be stated generally, that mere
articles of furniture movable in their
nature, though temporar'ly fastened
while in use, do not become a part of
the realty nor pass therewith. See
Ewell on Fixtures 298, et seq., and
cases there cited. See, also, Kimball v.
Grand Lodge of Masons, Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, April 1881.
As to the decision in the principal
case, it is 1l,,ievcd that the cases above
cited will Iiiow that there can be no
reasonabl .oubt as to its correctness.
MARSHALL D. EwrmE .

Chicag
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Supreme Court of Iowa.
PERKINS, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.
The courts, by mandamus, may compel the directors of a school to admit a pupil
who has been unlawfully excluded; and such pupil is not restricted to the statutory
remedy by appeal from the board of directors to the county superintendent, provided by the Code: sects. 1829-1835.
Where a board of school directors made a rule that any pupil guilty of defacing
or injuring any school property, should be required to pay all damages ; that notice
thereof should be sent to the parents or guardians of the pupil, and in default of
payment, the case should be reported to the president of the board; and that pupils
thus reported should not afterwards be allowed to attend until payment of damages
.hould be made or the case otherwise adjusted : and a pupil, while playing ball,
accidentally batted a ball through a window of the school-house: .ield, that the
directors had no authority to make or enforce such a rule, and that such pupil could
not lawfully be excluded from the school till payment was made for the damage thus
done.

from Polk Circuit Court.
Mandamus to compel defendants to admit plaintiff into the
public school of their district. A demurrer to plaintiff's petition
was sustained and judgment rendered for defendants. Plaintiff
APPEAL

appeals.
Baroroft 4 6NcCaughan,for appellant.
Brown

-Dudley, for appellees.

BEcK, J.-The petition alleges that the plaintiff is a minor, of
the age of twelve years, and resides within the bounds of the school
district of which defendants are directors ; that, under the law, he

has a right to attend defendants' school, and did so attend until
the superintendent, in obedience to an order of defendants, refused

him admittance thereto; and that he is a person of good moral
character, and has not been guilty of gross immorality nor of the

persistent violation of any rule of the school. The petition shows
that plaintiff was expelled from the school upon the following
grounds:
1. "That on or about the twentieth day of September, 1880,
while he, in company with other pupils of said school, was engaged
in playing ball, at a proper time, in the neighborhood of said
school-house, he unintentionally and by accident batted a ball
through one of the windows of the school-house, breaking a glass
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of the value of about three dollars; that the defendants had made
a rule as follows: 'Scholars who shall be guilty of defacing or
injuring any school property shall be required to pay for all damages. Notice of such damage shall be sent to the parents or
guardians of the pupil, and, in default of payment, the case shall
be reported to the president of the board, who may proceed with
it according to law. Scholars thus reported to the president shall
not afterwards be allowed to attend until payment of damages
shall have been made, or the case otherwise adjusted;' that in
pursuance of such rule, payment of said damages was demanded,
and notice thereof sent to plaintiff's parents, but plaintiff says that
he is a child without means, and unable to earn means to pay such
damage, and as a minor is not legally bound to pay the same; that
his parents refused to pay for said glass; and that for such nonpayment, and for no other cause or excuse, or pretence of cause,
the said Parish (the superintendent of the school) refused, and
refuses, him admittance to said school, and the defendants ratified
his refusal, and have directed him, as aforesaid, not to admit
plaintiff into said school until the payment of such damage."
The plaintiff alleges that defendants have no authority to enforce
the rules under which he was excluded from the school, and
that the action of the defendants in expelling him is unjust and
oppressive, and in violation of his rights. To the petition defendants demurred on the grounds (1) that the court has no jurisdiction
of the cause of action set out in the petition, the law creating a
special tribunal to which plaintiff should appeal from the action of
the board of directors; (2) the facts stated in the petition do not
show the rule under which plaintiff was expelled from school to be
unreasonable or-unlawful, and in excess of the authority of the
defendants in the government of the school.
2. We shall first inquire whether the Circuit Court has jurisdiction of this action. The statute provides that any- person
aggrieved by any order or decision of the directors of a school
district may appeal te the county superintendent, and from him an
appeal may-be prosecuted to the superintendent of public instruction : Code, sects. 1829, 1835. We need not inquire to what class
of cases, wherein the directors may-make decisions and orders,
appeals to the county superintendent are limited. That they are
limited is very plain. It cannot be held that decisions and orders
refusing the alowance and payment of claims against the-district,

792

PERKINS v. DIRECTORS OF WEST DES MIONES.

or construing contracts, or affecting the possession of or right to
property, when the interest of a citizen is affected thereby, may
not be questioned except upon appeal. That many such decisions
and orders cannot be reviewed under the statutes quoted, upon
appeal, must be conceded. It is not necessary to inquire just what
class may be appealed to the county superintendent, and in what
cases original actions may be prosecuted in the courts. It is very
plain that in one class of cases appeals are not the exclusive
remedy for reviewing or assailing the decisions and orders of the
school directors.
This class includes all cases wherein the jurisdiction and power
of the directors are brought in question, and wherein questions
arise involving the construction of statutes conferring power upon
school officers. The courts of the state are the arbiters of all
questions involving the construction of the statutes conferring
authority upon officers and jurisdiction upon special tribunals. It
was certainly never the intention of the legislature to confer upon
school boards, superintendents of schools, or other officers discharging quasi judicial functions, exclusive authority to decide
questions pertaining to their jurisdiction and the extent of their
power. All such questions may be determined in the courts of the
state. Hence, when the rights of a citizen are involved in the
exercise of authority by a school officer, the courts may determine
whether such authority was lawfully exercised. The courts, by
mandamus, may compel the directors of a school to admit a pupil
who has been unlawfully excluded. See Clarks v. The Board of
Directors, 24 Iowa 266; Smith v. Independent School District,
40 Id. 518; Dove v. Same, 41 Id. 689.
8. We are next to inquire whether defendants, as school directors, had authority to promulgate and enforce the rule under
which plaintiff was excluded from the school.
It will be observed that plaintiff was guilty of no breach of
discipline or of any offence against good order. By an accident
and without an evil purpose he broke a window-glass. The rule
requires him to pay the damages done, and in default thereof
authorizes the directors to exclude him from the school. We may
admit that he ought to pay the damages, and is liable therefor;
but we think his omission to perform this duty cannot be punished
by expulsion from the school. The state does not deprive its
citizens of their property or their liberty, or of any rights, except
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as a punishment for a crime. It would be very harsh and
obviously unjust to deprive a child of education for the reason
that through accident and without intention of wrong he destroyed
property of the school district. Doubtless a child may be expelled
from school as a punishment for breach of discipline, or for offence
against good morals, but not for innocent acts. In this case
the plaintiff was expelled, not because he broke the glass, but
because he did not pay the damage sustained by the breaking.
His default in this respect was no breach of good order or good
morals. The rule requiring him to make payment is not intended
to secure good order, but to enforce an obligation to pay a sum of
money. We are clearly of the opinion that the directors have no
authority to promulgate or enforce such a rule.
We conclude that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to
the petition. Reversed.
ROTHROCK,J., dissenting.-The Code, sect. 1829, provides as

follows: "Any person aggrieved by any decision of, or order of,
the district board of directors, in matter of law or fact, may, within
thirty days after the rendition of such decision, or the making of
such order, appeal therefrom to the county superintendent." By
sect. 3376 it is provided that "an order of mandamus shall
not be issued in any cause where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. * * *" Now,
if the plaintiff in this case had the right to appeal from the order
of the directors prohibiting him from attending the school, and if
an appeal was an inadequate remedy, the proceeding by mandamus
cannot rightfully be maintained. The board of directors have
power to make rules and regulations for the government of the
schools : Code, sect. 1726. The directors are required to aid the
teachers in establishing and enforcing rules for the government of
the schools: sect. 1734. And they may dismiss or suspend any
pupils from the school for gross immorality, or for persistent violation of the regulations or rules of the school: sect. 1735.
The rule or regulation under which the plaintiff was suspended
may have been wrongful, and one which, the directors ought not to
have made; and it may be that it should not have been enforced
against the plaintiff. But these questions could have been fully
and fairly tested in the ordinary course of the law, by an appeal
to the county superintendent. It is no answer to this position to
say that the remedy by appeal provided by law is inadequate,
VOL. XXI.-100
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because the decision of the county superintendent, or the state
superintendent, if appeal be taken to him, cannot be enforced.
The presumption is that if, upon appeal, the order should be
reversed, the directors wlll obey the decision of the appellate
tribunal. Upon their refusal to do so it will be time enough to
resort to the courts for the writ of mandamus. As is said in Rd.
.Dist. of Lowell v. Ind. Dist. of Duser, 45 Iowa 394, "while his
action (the county superintendent's) would not be in the nature of a
judgment, upon which process for the collection of the amount
awarded to the party recovering could issue, it would be a decision
binding upon the parties." In Marshallv. Sloan, 35 Iowa 445, it
was squarely held that a party aggrieved by the action of a board
of school directors, having an adequate remedy by appeal to the
county superintendent, and from him to the state superintendent,
is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. And in Kirkpatrick v.
Ind. Dist. of Liberty, 53 Iowa 585, it was held that the remedy
of a teacher who was wrongfully discharged by a board of directors
for incompetency was by appeal, and that he could not at once
maintain an action for breach of the contract under which he was
employed as a teacher.
It appears to me that this is a case where the remedy by appeal
is peculiarly appropriate. The controversy is one concerning the
proper government of the school, and it should be determined by
the tribunal appointed by law to settle such questions. If resort
can be had to the courts without first appealing to the county
superintendent, and from him to the state superintendent, the law
allowing an appeal becomes a dead letter, and wholly useless'and
inoperative. The cases cited in the majority opinion, it appears
to me, have no bearing upon the question as to whether the action
of mandamus is the proper remedy. No such question was made
in the pleadings, nor upon the trials below, nor upon appeal in this
court. The mere fact that those actions were in form proceedings
in mandamus, and the court did not of its own motion refuse to
ep.tertain jurisdiction, cannot be held as determining that mandamus was the proper remedy.
In my opinion the ruling of the court below upon the demurrer
was correct, and I am authorized to say that SEEVERS, J., concurs
in the views which I have herein expressed.
The statute of Iowa (1 McClain's
btatites, 1880, sects. 1734, 1735), respecting the authority of boards of

directors to make rules for the govern
ment of schools, is as follows:
Sect. 1734. "They (the board of
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only after all other means have failed.
The teacher has no authority, under the
orders of the directors, to expel a pupil
for refusing to pursue a certain study
forbidden by the parent : ulison v. Post,
79 I1. 567. See also, 31orrow v. 1Vood,
35 Wis. 59; s. c. 13 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 692.
Under the statute of Iowa, it is competent for boards of school directors to
provide by rules, that pupils may be
suspended from the schools in case they
shall be absent or tardy, except for
sickness or other unavoidable cause, a
certain number of times within a fixed
period: Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa
562.
In Vermont, it has been held, that the
school committee may exclude children
government of the schools, is not ex- from school for absence contrary to the
pressly defined by statute, it may be rules thereof, notwithstanding such absaid, in general terms, that such rules sence is pursuant to the command of their
and regulations must be reasonable.
Roman Catholic parents and by direcNeither the teacher nor the board of
tion of their priest, for the purpose of
directors have a discretionary power attending religious services on Corpus
of expulsion, but only for reasonable
Christi day: Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt.
eause: Fitzgerald v. LNorthcote, 4 Fost.
444; s. c. 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
& Fin. 685, per CoCKnURN, C. J.;
570. See, however, an able criticism
Bidison v. Post, 79 I1. 567, 571. The
upon this case by Hon. I. F. REDrule as to what is to be considered
3FELD, in 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
reasonable was thus stated by BECK, J.,
588.
in Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562:
While the board of directors of a
"-Any rule of the school, not subverschool district in Iowa have power,
sive of the rights of the children or
under the statute, to dismiss a pupil for
parents, or in conflict with humanity
gross immorality, or for persistent violaand the precepts of divine law, which
tion of the regulations of the school, it
tends to advance the object of the law
no power to dismiss or suspend for
has
in establishing public schools, must be
conduct short of this, as for acts done
It
proper."
considered reasonable and
out of school, which, though having
is, of course, to be understood algo, that
a tendency to incite ridicule of the
law
the
conflict
with
not
rule
must
such
directors and insubordination in the
of the land.
school, are not immoral, or prohibited
the
of
exercise
the
of
The propriety
by any rule or regulation: Murphy v
power to suspend or expel for nonTlie Board of Directors of the Indecompliance with the rules of the school
District of Marengo, 30 Iowa
pendent
la been before the courts in a variety
429.
of cases.
In Massachusetts, where the school
In Illinois the school directors have
of a town have power to pass
committee
no power to expel a pupil for any
rules and regulations for
reasonable
all
reason except disobedient, refractory or
discipline and managogovernment,
the
.ncorrigibly bad conduct, and

directors) shall visit the schools in their

districts, and aid the teachers in establishing and enforcing the rules for the
government of the schools."
Sect. 1735. " The majority of the
board in independent districts shall have
power, with the concurrence of the president of the board of directors, to dismiss or suspend any pupils from the
school in their district for gross immorality, or for a persistent violation
of the regulations or rules of the school,
and to re-admit them, if they deem
proper so to do."
Where the authority of teachers and
school directors, or other officers having
the supervision and control of schools,
to make rules and regulations for the

for these
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ment of the public schools under their
general charge and superintendence, a
school committee has power, not subject
to revision, if exercised in good faith,
to exclude a pupil from the public school
for misconduct which injures its discipline and management, although such
conduct is not mutinous or gross, and
does not consist of a refusal to obey the
teachers, or of any outrageous proceedings, but of acts of neglect, carelessness
of posture in his seat and recitation,
tricks of playfulness, and inattention
to study and the regulations of the
school in minor matters : Hodgkins v.
.Rochport, 105 Mass. 475. See also,
Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 Fost. & Fin.
687. So, the school committee may, in
that state, in order to maintain the
purity and discipline of the public
schools, exclude therefrom a child whom
they deem to be of a licentious and immoral character, although such character
is not manifested by any acts of licentiousness or immorality within the school:
Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charleston,
8 Cash. 160.
So, in that state,
the school committee may lawfully excluie from school a pupil who refuses
to comply with, and whose parents
refuse to request that he be excused
from complying with, a rule that during
prayer in the morning exercises each
pupil shall bow the head, unless his
parents request that he be excused from

doing so: Spiller v. Inhabitants of
Woburn, 12 Allen 127. See also, Dona
we v. Richards, 38 Me. 376.
Rules requiring pupils in grammar to
write English compositions, unless ex.
cused therefrom by request of their
parents and requiring pupils to be prepared with a rhetorical exercise at the
time appointed therefor, unless excused
on account of sickness or other reasonable cause, under penalty of suspension
or expulsion, have been held reasonable
and proper: Guernsey v. itAin, 32 Vt.
224 ; Sewell v. Board of Education, 29
Ohio St. 89.
Although rules, like the one passed
upon in the principal case, are believed
to be common, the second point there
in question does not appear ever before
to have been adjudicated upon. The
ruling of the court, however, seems so
reasonable and so in accordance with
principle, that there would seem to be
no doubt of its correctness. The only
remedy of the district in such a case is
to bring an action at law. Doubtless,
the board of directors might, by rule
properly framed; impose the penalty of
suspension or expulsion for any wilful
injury of the property of the district;
but paysent of damages resulting from
an innocent act cannot hereafter be thus
enforced.
M. D. Ewsnn.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
CITY OF LOGANSPORT v. JUSTICE.
In an action against a city for the recovery of damages occasioned by an injury
sustained by reason of a defective street or bridge thereof, it is sufficient proof of
notice to the city of such defect to show that either the councilmen, a councilman or
the street commissioner having charge of such street or bridge, knew of such defect
a reasonable length of time previous to the time of the injury so as to have repaired
such defect.
Before a party can complain that an instruction given to the jury is obscure in
its terms, or if he is apprehensive that the jury misunderstood it, he must move for
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such explicit qualification, or further instructions, as will obviate sUCh an assum
objection.
Where one of a number of instructions given to the jury is erroneous, but it is
clear upon all the instructions given that the jury were not misled, the giving of
such erroneous instruction is not sufficient cause for the granting of a new trial.
Evidence of the amount and value of the plaintiff's practice as a physician, for
five years previous to the time of receiving the injury, was admissible, not as the
measure of damages to which he was entitled, but to aid the jury in estimating the
amount to be awarded.

THIS was an action to recover damages for an alleged injury to
the plaintiff, received in driving over a bridge across a certain
ditch in the city, which, it was alleged, the city bad negligently
suffered to be and remain out of repair.
The complaint, having stated the plaintiff's profession to be that
of a physician and surgeon, and the injury, alleged "that before
and at that time, his professional services as a physician and
surgeon were of the value of $500 per month, and he was realizing
and earning that sum therefrom; and by reason of the injury to
his body and his great pain aforesaid, he was wholly incapacitated
and rendered unfit and unable to practice his profession, and compelled to remain within doors; and lost for that time his aforesaid
practice and the emoluments thereof, for a period of eight months,
to his damage of $4000," &c.
Issue, trial, verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the sum
of $1133.
F. Winfield, for appellant.

.D. 0 Justice, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WooDs, J.-The questions discussed by counsel for the appellant arise on the motion, made and overruled, for a new trial; and
they will be considered in the order presented by counsel.
The court gave the following instruction upon the subject of
notice to the city of the defective condition of the bridge, viz. :
"Notice to the councilmen or street commissioner, is notice to
the city."
It is insisted that this instruction is wrong, in so much as it
declares, that notice to the councilmen is notice to.the city. The
argument is, that councilmen, regarded as individuals and not as
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a collective body or as a committee of the collective body, have no
powers over, and are charged with no duties in respect to the
streets of the city; and, therefore, that notice to them of a defect
in a street, does not affect the city. The argument appears not
to be destitute of foundation; and if the premise be conceded, the
conclusion must probably follow. It may be observed, however,
that the argument proceeds upon a phraseology somewhat different
from that of the instruction. The latter says, "notice to the
councilmen," which naturally, if not necessarily, means all of
them; not some or any of them, as is assumed in the argument.
It is not an apt mode of expression to say "the councilmen," if
reference is intended to the members of the council in their indivilual capacities and relations; and embracing as it naturally does
, the members, the phrase is not inapt, when a reference to the
collective body is intended. Their coming or being altogether,
except in connection with their official duties, would be an unusual
and improbable occurrence; and a reference to them as "the
councilmen," in the instruction, may well be said to have meant
the official body of councilmen. Properly understood, therefore,
the instruction was not erroneous, upon the theory of law advanced
by the counsel; and if he was apprehensive of a mistaken understanding of it, he should have moved for such explicit qualification
or further instruction as was deemed necessary.
But suppose the instruction be interpreted as meaning the
councilmen as such, but not as assembled in council: Are they or
are they not charged with any duty in reference to the streets of
the city? Among the powers expressly conferred on the common
council as a body is to "have exclusive power over the streets,
highways, alleys and bridges within such city, * * * and to

make repairs thereof:" Sect. 61, Act of March 14th 1867;
1 Davis Rev. 1876, p. 300. This power, as well as many others
conferred in the same act, greatly concerns and affects the public
welfare, as well as private rights; and to the end that public and
private interests may not suffer from a failure to exercise, or from
negligence in the exercise of, such powers, the law gives an injured
party a remedy in damages against the city itself. To the
same end it is provided in the law, that "the common council
shall hold stated meetings at least twice in each month, and the
mayor or any five councilmen may call special meetings :" Sect.
47, Act of March 14th 1867. The provision for calling special
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meetings of the council was doubtless enacted in consideration of
the fact demonstrated by experience that emergencies will arise,
or may be reasonably expected to occur, requiring the early or
immediate action of the council, and when to await the time for a
regular meeting might entail disaster and loss, or, at least, the
hazard of loss and liability on the city. The power to call the
council together in special meetings may as well, and perhaps
more frequently, be exercised in reference to the condition of the
streets and bridges within the city, as any other subject of control
by the council. The power to call such meetings, by necessary
implication imposes the duty to make the call in proper cases.
It is true that five councilmen are required to concur in the call,
but the duty rests on each who has notice of the emergency, for it
is manifest that the refusal of any one of five who know of the
necessity of a meeting, to join the other four in a call therefor,
would not excuse the city from liability arising out of the failure
to call such meeting. The duty growing out of the power to call
special meetings in proper cases being, therefore, an individual
duty imposed on each member of the council, it is incumbent on
each, when informed of an emergency which requires the action
of the common council, to notify the mayor, or other councilmen
who may join in the necessary call, and if he negligently fails to
perform this duty, the city is liable to any one who may suffer
injury thereby.
We conclude, therefore, that notice to a councilman of a city
of the dangerous condition of a street or bridge within the city
limits is notice to the city. Our conclusion is fortified by a reference to the provisions of the law concerning the duties and powers
of the street commissioner, as found in section 28 of the Act of
May 14th 1867, already referred to, namely: " Sec. 28. It shall
be the duty of the street commissioner, under the direction of the
common council, to superintend the streets, alleys, market-places,
landings; the construction, repairing, cleaning, and lighting the
same, the building of sewers and drains, the purchase of the necessary implements of labor and the employment of laborers, and to
perform all the other duties incident to his office: Provided,he
shall have no power to contract for any debt or liability against
the city, unless specially authorized so to do by an order, resolution or ordinance of the common council, made in accordance witn
the powers vested in such council by this act."
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But if the powers of the street commissioner were more ample
and free from restriction, it would still be true under the other
provisions of the law to which we have adverted, that the councilmen have powers and a consequent duty in reference to the streets
of the city, and, this conceded, nothing is wanting to support the
conclusion already announced. The wisdom of the rule which
makes notice to councilmen notice to the city is shown by consideration of the fact that councilmen are elected from the different
wards of the city, and each is likely to observe, or at least soon to
learn of, the dangerous condition of any of the streets or bridges
in his ward or neighborhood, and by prompt action to secure the
necessary repairs or protection against danger.
In the dissenting opinion it is affirmed to be the universal rule,
"that the governing officers of a corporation, such as directors and
trustees, must, in order to bind the corporation, act as a collective
body, and in regular and lawful session," and that this rule applies
with peculiar force to the officers of municipal corporations, "discharging duties for the benefit of the public, and not for the promotion of private interests."
This principle is doubtless true and applicable to all subjects
concerning which the council must act, if at all, as a body, but it
does not seem to us to apply to the subject of notice. Notice to
the street commissioner, or to the mayor, is not notice to the council itself, but is notice to the city, on which the council must act,
in order to save the city from liability ; and the application of the
rule contended for, would relieve the council from the responsibility
of acting on such notice as well as upon notice to each individual
member of the council. The street commissioner and mayor
themselves can do nothing to repair a street or broken bridge, if it
requires the incurring of any debt or liability against the city, and
yet notice to them is sufficient. The mayor can discharge his
duty, by calling the council together for the purpose of enabling
it to take steps to have the street made good. But suppose the
councilmen ignore the call of the mayor, and neglect to assemble
in lawful session, the repairs are not made, and some one is
.njured? The city is held liable, but why ? Not on account of
any fault of the mayor or street commissioner;, they have each
done their whole duty, undef the powers conferred on them. Not
on account of any negligence of the common council, because that
has not been in session, and could not act. But unless there has
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been fault somewhere, and in somebody who represented the city,
there can be no liability at all. It is clear that the only fault is
in the individual councilmen, in failing to assemble, and for that
fault the city is made responsible.
If the doctrine is enforced that the city is not liable for the conduct of councilmen, but only on account of the action of the
council in lawful session, then notice to all the councilmen, though
assembled together in the council hall, would not be good if given
just before the commencement or just after the close of the session.
Such a proposition does not command the assent of conscience and
reason, and can hardly be accepted as the rule of law. For the
purpose of receiving notice, the councilmen of a city, under our
statute, are at all times the agents of the city, and within a reasonable time after receipt of notice, must move in the discharge of
the duty so imposed upon them. It may be said that the presumption is that the council his furnished and put at the disposal
of the ministerial officers the fu.iads necessary to meet the expenses
of emergencies, but presumptions of such a nature are by no
means always true, and the rules of law must be applicable in all
cases, and wherein the presumptions fail as well as where they
hold good.
It may be enough to guard against danger, without making
repairs, and the ministerial officers in most cases may be bound
and able to provide the necessary safeguards, but cases are supposable when they cannot do so. The mayor and street commissioner may be absent from the city, or sick, or dead, or they may
have resigned; and in such cases, unless notice to the councilmen
be good, there could be no notice at all. In such cases the public
interests imperatively require that the councilmen shall represent
the city; and it being conceded that notice to the councilmen
must be good in some cases, there can be no good reason for not
holding it good in all cases.
Objection is made to the second instruction given upon request
of the plaintiff, because it assumes the existence of a controverted
fact, namely, that the bridge in question was within the city. The
language of the instruction excepted to is as follows: "If the
bridge in question, being within the city, was defective," &c. , We
do not regard the instruction as assuming the fact stated. The
sentence is hypothetical not only in subject and predicate, but in
its subordinate or qualifying clauses as well See Morgan v.
Vor. XXIX.-101
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Wattles, 69 Ind. 260. If this were doubtful, it is clear upon all
the instructions given, the jury was not misled in this respect.
Further objection is made to this instruction because of the
clause saying that, if "this (the condition of the bridge) had continued for several days or weeks, then the city will be presumed, to
have had notice such as will bind her in that regard."
In answer to an interrogatory, the jury found the fact to be,
that the bridge had been in the condition it was in at the time the
plaintiff was injured for "about two weeks ;" and in answer to
another interrogatory, it was found, that there bad been negligence
on the part of the city or of her street commissioner, at and before
the accident, to keep the bridge in repair whenever discovered to
be out of repair. Under any ordinary circumstances, and the evidence discloses nothing extraordinary, the fact of a bridge having
been out of repair and in a dangerous condition, would warrant an
inference of knowledge on the part of the officers of the city or
some of them having duties in reference thereto, of the fact: see
Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y. 605. If, therefore, not strictly
correct, it is manifest that the instruction did the appellant no
harm; and under sections 101 and 580 of the Code, we are forbidden to reverse a case when it appears that the merits of the cause
have been fairly tried in the court below. These considerations
dispose too of the objection made to the first instruction, in reference to the time of the notice to the city. The rule no doubt is as
claimed, that "the city is responsible only for reasonable diligence
to repair the defect or prevent accidents, after the unsafe condition
of the street is known :" Dillon on Mun. Corp., sect. 416; but
from the answers to interrogatories, as well as upon the evidence,
it is clear that the city had notice in due time to have made repair
of the bridge in question.
It is also claimed, that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to make proof concerning his professional earnings before his
injury. Summing up on this topic, the counsel for the appellant
says:

"In substance, the plaintiff is permitted to prove what his professional earnings had been per year for five years, and how much
his business had fallen off during six months succeeding the injury.
This was permitted to go to the jury under an allegation in the
complaint, that the plaintiff was damaged in his business, and asking a recovery for the same. The damages are for a personal
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injury. This evidence was admissible in estimating the value of
time lost, but not as a basis of damages. Taken in connection
wi'th the demand of the complaint, and the instruction of the court,
the evidence was clearly admitted as a basis of damages. it has
been held, that similar evidence is competent, not as a basis of
damages, but as a guide to the jury, to aid them in the exercise
of their discretion."
The following are the authorities in support of this proposition :
6 Bing. (N. C.) 212; 11 Mich. 543; 43 N. H. 493; 5 R. I. 299;
20 How. 34; 23 Wend. 425; 33 N. J. (4 Yr.) 434; 11 Allen
73. In addition to these cases cited by counsel, see in point, The
City of Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224; Thte Town of Elkhart v. Bitter, 66 Id. 136.
We have no doubt the testimony was admissible, and indeed, the
proposition of counsel for the appellant concedes as much. It did
not furnish the measure of the damages to which the plaintiff was
entitled, but the jury had a right to consider it in estimating the
compensation to be awarded; and it is evident from the amount
of the verdict, that this is the use they made of it. It is enough
however, to meet the exception to its introduction, that the evidence was admissible for any purpose. If the court gave instructions authorizing a misuse of the evidence, exception should have
been taken to the instruction. It has not been pointed out wherein
the instructions were wrong in this direction.
We find no available error in the record. Judgment affirmed
with costs.
ELLIOT, J., dissenting.
NOTic.-A resolution of the common council to repair the defective
street, is sufficient proof of notice: Erd
v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443; so where
another person had been injured by
reason of the same defect in the street:
Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169 ; or that
notice to the chairman of the board of
town supervisors had been given :
Jaquish v. Ithaca, 36 Wis. 108. In
Maine notice to some of the principal
citizens is sufficient: Mason v. Ellsworth, 32 Ale. 271 ; Tuell v. Paris, 23
Id. 556; French v. Brunswick, 21 Id.
29 ; but not so in Massachusetts: Don-

aldson v. Boston, 16 Gray 508; nor in
Iowa: Cramer v. Burliqton, 39 Iowa
512 ; nor in Connecticut: Bill v. N¢orwich, 39 Conn. 222. And it has been
held that notice.to two town trustees
was not sufficient: Bush v. Geneva, 3
N. Y. S. C. 409 ; nor to an alderman:
Peach v. Utica, 10 Hun 477. And where
citizens of a city cast rubbish into a street
contrary to a city ordinance, it was held
that the city was not liable for an injury
received by reason thereof, unless express notice thereof was received by its
officers : Griffin v. Mayor, 4-c., 9 N. Y.
456. This case is recognised as an au-
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thority in a number of cases, but in
Hume v. Mayor, 4-c., 47 N Y. 639
(1872), the Court of Appeals declares
that " A municipal corporation is not
liable for injuries caused to individuals
by obstructions on the highway not
placed there by its own officials, or by
authority of the city government, until
after actual notice of their existence, or
until by reason of the lapse of time it
should have had knowledge, and, therefore,
actual notice may be presumed." Dorlon
v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. 604, follows the
doctrines of Griffin v. Mayor, 6-. And
so in Fahey v. Town of Harvard,62 Ill.
28, it was held, under like circumstances,
that if the obstruction remained for some
time notice would be implied. The
City of F. Wayne v. Dewitt, 47 Ind.
391, has been cited to show that actual
notice was necessary, but a close examination of the text of the case does
not authorize such a deduction. As
to actual notice, see Rowell v. Williams,
29 Iowa 210. So, where a city permitted a coal-vault to be constructed
under a sidewalk, and a hole in the
sidewalk for putting down coal was
used which was covered with a movable
grate, and while such grate was removed for three minutes, a child fell
through it and was injured, it was held
that the city was not liable, because it
had no notice that such hole was uncovered, nor was it negligence, per se,
to permit such vault to remain under
the walk after actual notice thereof:
Lafayette v. Blood, 40 Ind. 62.
And where a city is in fault in the
construction of public works-a sewernotice need not be proven: Springfield
v. LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476; Alexander v.
Mt. Sterling, 71 Id. 366; Chicago v.
Brophy, 79 Id. 277 ; foore v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 300; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54.
"And a city whose officers know that
the general condition of a walk is such
that, from mere decay, such an accident
is liable to happenupon it any moment,

is chargeable with negligence if it neglects to repair, Without bringing home
to the authorities actual knowledge of
the looseness of the particular plank
which happened to occasion the injury :"
Weisenberg v. City oJ Appleton, 26 Wis
56 ; s. c., 7 Amer. R. 37.
In Requa v. City of Rochester, 85 N.
Y. 129, it was said that notice to one
of the members of the city council wab
insufficient as notice to the city, but
could be used to establish the notoriety
of the defect in the street. Notice to a
citizen is not notice to the town : Donaldson v. Boston, 16 Gray 508 ; contra,
Springer v. Bowdoinham, 7 Greenl. 442;
Mason v. Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271 ; quere,
Rowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa 210.
It was held that the following charge
to the jury was properly given: "That
in the absence of proof of express notice
to the defendant of the defect which was
the alleged cause of the injuries received
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot
recover unless the jury finds that such
defect was so open and palpable as to be
apparent, and necessarily attract the
attention of passers by :" Dewey v. City
of Detroit, 15 Mich. 307. To the same
effect are the cases of Cleveland v. St.
Paul, 18 Minn. 279; Hart v. Brooklyn,
36 Barb. 226 ; Doulon v. City of Clinton, 33 Iowa 397; City of Quincy v.
Barker, 81 Ill. 300; City of Aurora v.
.Hillman, 90 Id. 61; Rapho v. Moore,
68 Penn. St. 404; Ward v. Jefferson,
24 Wis. 342; Johnson v. Haverhill, 35
N. H. 74 ; Reed v. Northfield, 18 Pick.
94 ; Howe v. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99;
Manchester v. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118 ;
Morrill v. Deering, 3 N. H. 53 ; Howe v.
Plainfield, 41 Id. 135; Lobdeli v. New
Bedford, 1 Mass. 153; Goodnough v.
Oshkosh, 24 Wis. 549; Rowel v. Williams, 29 Iowa 210; Canal Co. v.
Graham, 63 Penn. St. 290; Decatur v.
Fisher., 53 111. 407 ; Springfieldv. Doyle,
76 Id. 202; Rockford v. Hildebrand,61
Id. 155 ; Bartlett v. Kittery, 68 Me.
358 ; Lindholm v. St. Paul. 19 Minn.
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245 - Furnell v. St. Paid, 20 Id. 117 ;
Colley v. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181 ; s. c.,
2 Amer. R. 30; Hunre v. Mayor of
New York, 74 N. Y. 264; Atlanta v.
Perdue, 53 Ga. 607; Market v. St.
Louis, 56 Mo. 189 ; Chicago v. Crooker,
2 Ill. App. 279 ; Warren v. Wright,
3 Id. 602; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60
Ala. 486; Erd v. St. Paul, 22 Minn.
443; Mack v. Salem, 6 Oregon 275;
Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358 ; Clark
v. Corinth, 41 Vt. 449; Niven v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 619.
In 1866, after ftill argument in the
House of Lords, Mr. Justice BLACKBURN declared the rule to be that, where
the defendant had the means of knowledge
and negligently remained ignorant, that is
equivalent in creating a liability to actual
knowledge: Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11
H. L. Cas. 687; s. c. Law Rep., 1 H.
L. 93. See to same effect: Rapho v.
Moore, 68 Penn. St. 404; S. c., 8
Amer. R. 2 02 ; Weisenberg v. Appleton,
26 Wis. 56; a. c. 7 Amer. R. 39;
Submarine Tdegraph Co. v. Dickson, 15
C. B. (N. S.) 759 ; Powers v. The City
of Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa 197 ; Rowell
v. Williams, 29 Id. 210; Boucher v.
New Haven, 40 Conn. 456.
It is necessary to allege in the
pleadings that the city had notice of the
defect in the highway: Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney. 538; The City of
,R. Wayne v. DeWitt, 47 Ind. 391;
Noble v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271;
contra, Serrot v. Omaha City, 1 Dillon
C. C. R. 312.
DANAGEs.-Where a pedler sued for
damages occasioned by a personal injury,
it was held competent for him to prove
the nature and character of his business,
the extent of his loss of time, also of the
percentage on the goods sold by him in
his usual course of business, the loss
of interest of money received for the
same in consequence of the injuries received, and the annual amount of sales
made by him: Hanover Railroad Co. v.
Coyle, 55 Penn. St. 396. The injured
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party is entitled to recover for the
diminution of the receipts of his business, resulting from such inability to attend to it, or the injury caused him:
Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74; but
where the profits of the injured party's
business in the past are uncertain, proof
thereof is incompetent: .Masterton v.
Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391 ; such proof
is competent where his earnings can be
shown with reasonable certainty: Id. ;
McIntyre v. New York Central Railroad
Co., 37 N. Y. 287 ; Grant v. Brooklyn,
41 Barb. 381.
So, in Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2
Black 590, proof that the plaintiff was
a physician, and the extent of his practice was held competent; to the same
effect is Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34.
A similar ruling was held in the case of
a lawyer plaintiff: Walker v. The Erie
Railroad Co., 63 Barb. 260; see also
Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer 233, affirmed in 1 Kern. 416 ; Moore v. Cent.
Railroadof Iowa, 47 Iowa 688: Nones
v. Northouse, 46 Vt. 587 ; Howes v.
Ashfield, 99 Mass. 540. Such evidence
is not competent as furnishing a measure
of damages, but to guide the jury in the
exercise of that discretion as to the
amount of damages which, to a certain
extent, is always vested in the jury it
such cases : New Jersey Express Co. v.
Jonathan, 33 N. J. Law 434 ; Ingrain
v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; Alhson v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 543; Taylor
v. Dustin, 43 N. H. 493; Simmons v.
Brown, 5 R. I. 299 ; Lincoln v. Saratoga
6" Schenectady Railroad Co., 23 Wend.
425 ; Fulsomev. Concord,46 Verm. 135.
Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 562;
Bradsluw v. L. 6- Y. Railway Co., Law
Rep., 10 C. P. 189 ; Lombardv. (hicago,
4 Biss. 460.
For loss of practice by a physician.
Mletcalfv. Baker, 57 N. Y. 662; Welch
v. UWare, 32 Mich. 77 ; City of Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224.
So it was held that evidence was admissible that the plaintiff's business was
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dealing in land, and also the value of
his business and the profits arising from
it. The plaintiff can recover profits in
such a case which might reasonably be
anticipated, but if the business was uncertain and speculative, and not attended
with any reasonable certainty of profits,
then none can be recovered : Penn. Railroad Co. v. Dale, 76 Penn. St. 47.
Such facts must be especially alleged :
Taylor v. Munroe, 43 Conn. 36 ; Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Id. 562 ; contia:
Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; City of
C~hcago v. O'Brennan, 65 Ill. 160.
But where his business is of such a
nature that the profits therein are uncertain, proof of his past profits is incompetent : M1asterton v. M3t. Vernon,
58 N. Y. 391, disapproving the ruling
in Walker v. The Erie Railroad Co.,
supra.
So where the practice of a physician
was carried on in an unlawful manner,
evidence on behalf of the defendant is
admissible to show that fact, the court
saying: " As the plaintiff sought to recover damages on account of being disabled from practising his profession, his
reputation, as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of his practice, became a
proper subject of inquiry, the value of
that practice must have depended very
largely upon that reputation. If his
practice was unlawful, no matter how
lucrative it might have been, the loss of
it would lay no foundation for the recovery of damages. * ** The plaintiff's
claim in effect, put his professional reputation in issue and made these questions
proper: Jacques v. BridgeportRailroad
Co., 41 Conn. 61; a. c. 19 Amer. R.
483. It was said in Baltimore 4- Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Boteler, 38 Md. 568,
"but evidence that he was a man of
intemperate habits, and when intoxi-

cated, was unable to transact business
could not tend to elucidate that questior
[viz. : the amount of compensation tc
which he was entitled], and was not
admissible for that purpose."
Where the evidence showed that the
physician had a large and lucrative practice-in one instance receiving a 50001.
fee-evidence was admitted to show the
yearly amount of the same: the jury
having awarded 70001. damages, a new
trial was granted because the damages
were inadequate : Phillips v. South-western Railway Co., 4 Q. Div. 406 ; 8. c.
20 Alb. L. J. 209 ; s.c. 9 Cent. L. J.
125. A verdict on the second trial was
obtained for 16,0001.: 10 Cent. L. J.
284,. affirmed in Exchequer Chamber:
5 Q. B. Div. 78; s. c. 20 Alb. L. J.
332 ; 9 Cent. L. J. 365. In Hlolyoke
v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 48 N. H.
541, the court uses the following language : "Plaintiff will not be entitled
to special damages on account of any
particular calling or profession. The
injury is personal to the man. The description in plaintiff's writ designating
him as a timber merchant, was merely
descriptio persone, inserted there for
identification and nothing more. We do
not understand that plaintiff's declaration in his writ contained any averment
under which he could claim damages in
consequence of his trade; or that the
law would allow his damages to be enhanced on any such account. Such averment, if made, would simply be immaterial and of no advantage to the plaintiff'" This ruling is supported by
Ballou v. Barnum, 11 Allen 73, which
is cited by the court. Contra; Baldwin
v. Western Railway Corporation, 4 Gray
333.
W. W. THomtoN.

